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9.1 Introduction
The concept of multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) is used as both an 
analytical tool and a policy prescription – often at the same time. On the 
one hand, a vast academic literature is dedicated to MSPs, drawing on the 
theoretical fields of governance, networks and management (Noor, 2010).1 
On the other hand, the MSP notion has emerged from development 
practitioners’ and policymakers’ conceptions of dialogue and partnership.
We define MSPs as cooperation between different stakeholders that have 
an interest in a problem and together engage in a process of dialogue and 
cooperative action to address this problem (Vermeulen et al., 2008, p. 97; 
Hemmati, 2002, p. 2). These ‘different stakeholders’ are often conceived as 
coming from the private, public and civil sectors. Thus, MSPs can be seen as 
extended versions of, or related to, public–private partnerships (PPPs), 
which are defined as ‘arrangements whereby private parties participate in, 
or provide support for, the provision of infrastructure, resulting in a 
contract for a private entity to deliver public infrastructure-based service’ 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2004 cited in Multipart, 2008, p. 43).
The common ground for an interest in MSPs, among development 
practitioners and policymakers, can be found across the processes of 
interaction and governance (Noor, 2010). As Nuijten eloquently states: ‘the 
MSP concept is buttressed by a belief in the power of dialogue and consensus-
building in breaking down institutional and power barriers, and the ability 
of people at the local level to manage local resources’ (Nuijten, 2004, p. 
116, original emphasis). The leading international donors and policymaking 
institutions propagate this belief in MSPs in water management in general, 
and in the water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector in particular.
For example, the United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (DfID, 2011, p. 41) welcomes MSPs as a ‘promising mechanism 
towards building cooperative water management’ and calls the water crisis 
a ‘crisis of governance’ (Plummer and Slaymaker, 2007). The United 
Nations sees multi-stakeholder governance as a pillar of WASH policy 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2004). The Organisation for 
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Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), too, considers 
partnerships and ‘multi-stakeholder dialogue’ as the solution for lacking 
state capacity and political will (2008, p. 34, 2012, p. 19).
Motivations for MSP dissemination invariably – either implicitly or 
explicitly – refer to the ability of MSPs to operationalize integrated water 
resource management, good governance and stakeholder participation, 
which are among the key concepts that dominate the debates on the 
management of water and waste over the last decades (see also Chapter 2). 
In this sense, the MSP concept is a rather complex one that contains 
elements of all three panaceas or perceived universal remedies that are 
described in Chapter 2. MSPs are perceived as a way to enhance equity, 
accountability, democracy, transparency, participation and integration 
(Noor, 2010, p. 36). MSPs are praised for their ability to link top-down and 
bottom-up; indigenous and foreign; and state and non-state approaches 
and are assumed to make service delivery more inclusive, participatory and 
effective (Hofmann, 2009, cited in Noor, 2010, p. 36; van Tongeren and van 
Empel, 2007, p. 14).
With the adoption of Agenda 21, specifically its section on ‘strengthening 
the role of major groups’, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, partnerships 
and MSPs were introduced as new forms of governance. The importance of 
partnerships was reiterated at the Johannesburg Summit in 2002 (Multipart, 
2008). Recognizing that neither the state, nor the market, nor communities 
seem to be able to manage water on their own, MSPs were coupled with 
integrated water resource management (De Boer and Pfisterer, 2009). The 
emergence of MSPs can therefore also be perceived as part of a process of 
diversification of governance modalities (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005, p. 
199; Pierre and Peters, 2000).
In this chapter, we discuss both the transfer of the MSP concept in the 
water and the waste sector, and the underlying assumption that this 
governance concept is – with some adjustments – applicable and effective 
also in fragile contexts that are characterized by conflict, political instability 
and institutional multiplicity.
Based on fieldwork in the Palestinian Territories, we suggest that multi-
stakeholder governance of water, sanitation and waste management is a 
requirement for successful service provision in these sectors because of the 
fragility of the governance context. This is already widely recognized and 
applied by relevant Palestinian stakeholders and policymakers. As such, it is 
misguided to assume that MSPs are an entirely new construct, a tool that 
needs to be introduced to ‘modernize’ water management in developing 
countries and/or fragile situations. Our cases show that MSPs are not a new 
concept introduced by donor organizations, but emerge both with and 
without donor pressure. The relevant questions, then, evolve not around 
whether to promote or transfer MSPs, but how to enhance their effectiveness 
and added value in fragile settings, through the transfer of knowledge. The 
research question that guides our analysis is:
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How applicable are MSPs in fragile contexts? How can donor organizations play 
a role in enhancing the effectiveness and added value of MSPs in fragile 
situations, if at all?
To answer this question, we first describe the MSPs and their features. This 
includes the characteristics of each MSP (initiation and origin, objectives, 
actors, activities and approach, funding); the governance of each MSP 
(preparation phase, decision making and implementation, information 
and communication, completion, continuation; and the output of each 
MSP (achievement of objectives and sustainability).
Second, we analyse the added value and effectiveness of MSPs in the 
WASH sector. Effectiveness is defined here as the achievement of the 
objectives as set out by the stakeholders and the sustainability of these 
achievements. In addition to three cases from the water sector, we include a 
case from the waste sector. Due to its impact on the quality of the groundwater, 
we consider adequate solid waste management ‘part and parcel’ of effective 
water resource management in a region that is dependent on groundwater. 
We refer to this combined water and waste sector as WASH+.
Third, we focus on the contextual factors affecting the governance and 
effectiveness of the MSPs studied. Throughout the chapter we refer to 
several ideas of the Contextual Interaction Theory (CIT). This is relevant 
since the core assumption underlying CIT (that contextual factors assert 
important influence over the process and effectiveness of policy 
implementation) corresponds well with our main arguments. We do not, 
however, claim to apply all components of CIT in a comprehensive way. We 
particularly draw on the distinction between wider, structural and case-
specific contexts to address the impact of political instability (as part of the 
wider context) and institutional multiplicity (as part of the structural 
context) on MSPs. With structural context, we imply the multiplicity of 
governance levels, networks, perspectives, strategies and resources as 
envisioned by Bressers and de Boer in Chapter 3.
Two contextual factors are selected to illustrate the challenges of multi-
stakeholder governance concepts in fragile settings: the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict at large; and the fragmentation of the West Bank in areas A, B and 
C and the parallel institutions resulting from the governmental Hamas–
Fatah divide.
9.2 Methodology
Researchers from the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG), together with 
the authors, collected the data between 2009 and 2011 in a research project 
on four MSP cases in the water, sanitation and solid waste sectors. The 
research was part of the Peace, Security and Development Network (PSDN) 
initiated by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Stel et al., 2012). The 
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qualitative methodology comprised extensive literature and secondary 
sources research; in-depth interviews and focus groups with a total of ninety-
eight respondents; and four validation and consultation workshops with 
respondents and experts.2 The analysis of the MSPs was facilitated by a 
theoretical and analytical framework, which was developed by the 
consortium (Noor et al., 2010). The validation and consultation workshops 
that took place mid-term and at the end of the project further contributed 
to adequate interpretation and analysis of the data.
In the Palestinian Territories, the cases were selected on the basis of the 
general criteria from the PSDN. The selection criteria were that the MSP is 
organized around utilities such as water supply and sanitation, wastewater, 
and solid waste management; involves private, public and civil actors; and 
has a measurable output. An additional desire of local partners was to 
include initiatives which were of strategic importance or unique in some 
way. These unique features are elaborated upon in Section 9.4. Research on 
the case study in the Gaza Strip was hampered by impeded access to the 
Gaza Strip and lack of possibilities from PHG research staff in Gaza to 
communicate with the Head Office in Ramallah: video and Skype 
connections failed consistently. In the next section, we first discuss the 
development of MSPs as a tool in donor policy in the section below.
9.3 The features of Palestinian MSPs
The first case study concerns the rehabilitation of groundwater wells around 
two cities in the Northern West Bank: Qalqiliya and Tulkarem. Both cities 
are located close to the Green Line3 and the Separation Wall, the barrier 
built by Israel on the Palestinian side of the Green Line. The problems the 
MSP sought to address through the well rehabilitation included:
1 frequent interruption of water supply;
2 excessive operation costs for the wells;
3 high debts among well owners and municipalities running the wells;
4 limited well capacity; contamination by sewage water and flooding from 
settlements; limited pump capacity;
5 insufficient water supply to cover the needs of communities;
6 decreased agricultural productivity due to abandoned land; and
7 lack of skills among well owners and operators.
Farmers, groundwater well owners, village councils and municipalities, 
national governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and international organizations were able to ensure good 
cooperation and results by substantially increasing access to water4 for 
domestic and agricultural use.
The second case study regards a landfill located in the Zahrat Al Finjan 
region approximately 17 km south-west of the Northern West Bank city 
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Jenin. Before the establishment of the landfill, poor management of the 
solid waste collection and disposal services in Jenin governorate were 
considered to affect soil, public health, environment and water resources. 
The pollution created by the former unregulated waste dumps that have 
affected the groundwater supplies through infiltration in the soil was a 
great concern. This was not only an issue for the Palestinian authorities, but 
also for the Israeli authorities, since the surrounding Israeli settlements 
were extracting their water from the same source. The Zahrat Al Finjan 
landfill was initiated in 1998 by the World Bank under the Solid Waste and 
Environmental Management Project. The project aimed to implement an 
environmentally sound solid waste management system for the Jenin 
governorate, that included:
1 safe disposal of solid waste in controlled landfills;
2 environmentally sound collection and transfer of solid wastes to landfills 
in Jenin district;
3 stakeholder ownership of the project;
4 enhanced implementation capacity; and
5 enhanced monitoring and enforcement capacity.
The World Bank worked together with the European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), a number of ministries, local governmental 
organizations, such as the Jenin Service Council; the Project Implementation 
Unit and Jenin governor; Israeli authorities, and contractors. The success of 
this landfill project is remarkable, since the Second Intifada started almost 
immediately after the start of the project. Furthermore, the Israeli Civilian 
Administration granted approval to construct this facility while many other 
proposals were rejected or delayed. As a result, it is one of the few regulated 
and formal landfills in Palestine.
The third case study is a wastewater treatment plant located in Kharas in 
the southern part of West Bank, approximately eight kilometres west of 
Hebron City. The treatment plant project was a response to the local 
community that sought an alternative for sewage disposal into cesspits that 
polluted their groundwater as well as their drinking water supply. Local 
stakeholders (inhabitants, landowners, farmers, local councils) worked 
together with governmental organizations (both at local and national 
level), NGOs and international organizations. The project was among the 
first wastewater treatment plants implemented in the rural areas of the 
southern part of the West Bank. It is innovative since it collects and treats 
sewage at the village level, rather than at the household level. It introduced 
low-cost and efficient technology for sewage treatment with the objectives 
to improve hygienic conditions; protect water quality; reduce pollution 
loads; and demonstrate possibilities for sound collection and treatment of 
wastewater at the village level. During the first seven years, the treatment 
facility offered a good sanitary solution. Thereafter, the operation failed 
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due to challenges in management capacity, communication and revenue 
collection.
The fourth case study concerns a desalination plant in the Gaza Strip’s 
Bureij camp. This station was established after a 2006 assessment showed 
how much citizens in Bureij area suffered from high salinity of drinking 
water. The situation in Gaza is not only constrained by repeated episodes 
of violence and military operations and by withdrawal of donor 
organizations after Hamas won the elections, but also by a double public 
administration (one run by Hamas, the other one inactive under the 
Palestinian Authority). The MSP’s activities included rehabilitation and 
upgrading of a municipal well and installation of a desalination plant; 
construction of a reservoir to blend the water with water from other wells; 
closing of two contaminated wells; and the provision of training for the 
operation and management of the water supply system. The PHG and the 
Italian Civil Group of Volunteers (Groppo Volenterinto Civile) were 
responsible for implementation. They worked together with Terra des 
Hommes Italy, a local water committee, the Palestinian Water Authority, 
the Municipality of Bureij, the Coastal Municipal Water Utility, and Gaza 
Electrical Distribution Company.
9.4 Added value and effectiveness of the Palestinian MSPs
In the four Palestinian MSPs studied, the MSP approach was perceived as a 
self-evident and inevitable way of resolving problems in the water, wastewater 
and waste sector, rather than as a conscious or innovative way of arranging 
WASH+ services. Our research suggests that MSPs exist in Palestine as an 
empirical reality, but have little significance as an explicit policy concept. In 
Palestine, MSPs are implemented on a case-by-case basis, dependent on 
individual donors and NGOs. Those MSPs predominantly originated as 
organically emerging cooperation mechanisms rather than as results of 
conscious policymaking:
•	 In case 1, the MSP in Qalqiliya and Tulkarem, a group of farmers sent 
applications to the village council to help them rehabilitate some of 
their irrigation wells. The village council contacted the PHG to assist 
them for the rehabilitation of these wells and the PHG subsequently 
wrote a proposal and submitted this to the European Union and invited 
farmers and well owners to discuss their problems.
•	 In case 2, the Zahrat Al Finjan landfill, the MSP was designed explicitly 
as a MSP under the World Solid Waste and Environmental Management 
Project. Several workshops and meetings with key experts, however, 
indicated that such predetermined ‘MSP-ness’ is not common in 
Palestine.
•	 The MSP in Kharas, case 3, also emerged without any MSP blueprint or 
ideology. It was a response from the PHG to local community needs.
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•	 The MSP in Al-Bureij, case 4, started as a partnership between the Civil 
Group of Volunteers and the PHG. They cooperated with local 
community-based organizations, the municipality, the Palestinian 
Water Authority (PWA), and broadened partnership with participation 
of semi-public entities (utilities) to achieve the objectives.
In terms of the governance and implementation of the MSPs, our cases 
show that MSPs can have a multi-stakeholder governance structure or 
practice without being officially initiated as an MSP. These MSPs are 
therefore the result of the specific history consisting of previous decision-
making processes (see also Chapter 3). A history of professional cooperation 
and joint decision-making was found to contribute positively to the 
motivation of actors, to the functioning of MSPs and thereby to their 
effectiveness, but only when this history of cooperation was perceived as 
unproblematic. Such organically emerging processes are not necessarily 
ungoverned, anarchical or homogenous, but can arrive at much the same 
practices as ‘official’ MSPs (Warner cited in Nuijten, 2004, p. 118).
•	 The tasks of the main actors in case 1 had been specified pragmatically 
and a steering committee was eventually established (ECHO, 2010, p. 
64–66). The good cooperation between stakeholders was, according to 
our respondents, the result of a long history of professional cooperation 
and an intrinsic appreciation of cooperation by beneficiaries and 
partners. However, the sustainability of the project could not be 
ensured, despite being a priority among MSP members from the start.
•	 Case 2 seems to be exceptional as it explicitly opted for an MSP 
approach from its initiation. Respondents and evaluation reports recall 
intensive and institutionalized communication and dialogue among all 
stakeholders involved throughout all phases and continuous investment 
in realizing both anonymity and equity of all partners in the MSP’s 
decision-making process (World Bank, 2009). The World Bank’s 
on-the-ground-support unit provided for effective communication with 
the Israeli civilian and military authorities.
•	 The governance context of case 3 yields a less positive picture – of 
problematic communal relationships and a lack of internal capacity 
hampering communication and effectiveness. While the governance 
of the MSP was characterized by multi-stakeholder interaction, it was 
not a smooth process. Lengthy and intensive processes of negotiation 
were required among and with stakeholders; between village council 
and landowners; between community and ministries; and between 
the PHG and the national governmental institutions involved (EHP, 
2002).
•	 Due to political developments (electoral victory of Hamas) and the 
subsequent change of government in Gaza, the membership of 
stakeholder organizations in case 4 changed repeatedly. The uncertainty 
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during transition has affected not only the local water committee, but 
also the Municipality of Al-Bureij and the replacement of staff at PWA 
in Gaza.
When it comes to the effectiveness and output of the MSPs studied, several 
observations can be made. As noted above, multi-stakeholder involvement 
in the governance and implementation of a project does not guarantee 
achievement of all objectives as was seen in cases 3 and 4. The MSP 
established for the Zahrat Al Finjan landfill, which was most consciously 
and formally conceived of as an MSP, did have the most positive and 
sustainable output according to respondents. Whether this was due to the 
formalization of cooperation within the project or other factors such as 
the more extensive donor commitment is hard to establish. Nonetheless, 
respondents were convinced that the inclusive and communicative nature 
of the project contributed to its success. For the other three cases – 
MSPs in practice but not on official paper – achieving objectives in 
terms of ‘hardware’ (construction) proved significantly more feasible 
than improving ‘software’ (institutional strengthening, capacity building, 
awareness raising).
Considering the above, our findings are multiple – and perhaps 
paradoxical. On the one hand, the WASH+ initiatives we studied are 
functioning as MSPs even if they are not instigated as MSPs or officially 
presented and recognized as such. MSPs are thus an empirical reality even 
without being influenced by policy prescriptions. At the same time, we note 
that the output of the one MSP that was formally initiated and governed as 
an MSP (case 2) was more successful and sustainable in output terms. 
Although stakeholders attributed the success of this project to a range of 
factors, stakeholders repeatedly commended the MSP structure and 
governance of the Jenin Joint Service Council. Finally, for the effectiveness 
and outputs of the MSP, the added value of active involvement and 
commitment by donor organizations in MSPs is particularly recognized by 
stakeholders, primarily in relation to pressure on Israeli authorities for 
granting permits required during project implementation.
9.5 The influence of the wider context on Palestinian  
WASH+ MSPs
It is important to note that not everyone shares the widespread policy 
enthusiasm for MSPs in supranational policymaking networks described in 
Section 9.3. The ‘neutral’ management and government discourse in which 
MSPs are often cast, risks depoliticizing processes that are in fact highly 
political, and essentially determining ‘who gets what water, when and how’ 
(Tropp, 2005). Moreover, the difficulty of generating a common vision and 
action plan in conflict-affected situations is underrepresented in MSP 
research (Warner, 2006, p. 20). This multifaceted critique on MSPs as a 
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transferable policy concept is even more relevant in so-called fragile 
situations.
Two core features characterize politically fragile or hybrid situations and 
set them apart from ‘traditional’ developing settings: (1) (the risk of 
recurrent) violent conflict and the vulnerability to external shocks related 
to it; and (2) politicization of public goods provision and institutional 
multiplicity (Naudé et al., 2011; Boege et al., 2009; Hofmann, 2009).5 Below 
we explore the influence of a wider fragile context on the structural and 
case-specific contexts of our cases. For the Palestinian wider context, we 
draw attention to three concurrent attributes signifying fragility. The first 
contextual attribute is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at large, related to the 
risk of (recurrent) violent conflict. The second is the institutional 
multiplicity as exemplified by the governmental divide between Fatah and 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Third, there is the administrative fragmentation 
in areas A, B and C in the West Bank. We therefore focus on factors that are 
related to the political context, and much less to the economic, cultural or 
technological contexts.
The impact of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict on the institutional setting
The present problems regarding water resources management in Israel and 
the Palestinian Territories have their roots in the Partition Plan of 1947; the 
unilateral declaration of the establishment of Israel in 1948; the 1967 war; 
the Oslo Agreements and internal developments. Israel took control over 
the water resources in the West Bank after the 1967 war. This was arranged 
through a number of Military Orders. Before the Oslo Agreements, the 
West Bank Water Department was the largest water distributor in the West 
Bank. The Interim Agreement of 1995 facilitated the transfer of 
responsibilities to the PWA. This transfer has resulted in an intricate and 
multilevel governance system characterized by the inherent (even 
inevitable) involvement of multiple stakeholders.
First, the PWA and the Israeli Water Authority are legally obliged to work 
together in the Joint Water Committee, which was established as a result of 
the Interim Agreement. Although Joint Water Committee decision making 
is officially based on consensus and both countries are formally equally 
represented, stakeholders perceive that the committee reiterates existing 
power imbalances between Israel and Palestine.6 A PWA spokesperson 
called it ‘the unwelcome stakeholder’ (Stel, 2012, p. 5).
Second, cooperation between the PWA and municipalities is 
institutionalized and arranged by Local Authorities Law no. 1, 1997. However, 
the lack of sovereignty of the Palestinian authorities, and the subsequent lack 
of trust in the authorities, has led to a situation in which citizens do not rely 
on the state to provide certain basic services. As a result, some community-
based organizations and NGOs are trying to improve the local situation with 
regard to water supply, sanitation and hygiene, in cooperation with local 
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authorities. In this regard, various private enterprises, ranging from local 
truck vendors to fully fledged PPPs, fill the gap left by the public sector by 
responding to citizens’ demands and making profit from the situation.
Third, the Palestinian WASH+ sector – as in most other developing 
countries – includes many national and international NGOs and donor 
agencies. Bilateral and multilateral donors are involved in a variety of 
coordination mechanisms in various sectors. International NGOs and 
donors that are involved in water and sanitation coordinate their efforts in 
the Association of International Development Agencies; the Emergency 
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Group (EWASH); the Consolidated Appeal 
Process for the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the Organization for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
The uncertainty, politicization of service delivery and institutional and 
practical restrictions in terms of permits, mobility and access to water 
resources brought about by the conflict create a greater need for actors to 
work together. In our case studies, we found several examples of how this 
context shaped the motives, cognitions and resources of the actors 
involved in the MSPs. Regarding case 1, the impact of wider context 
specifically influenced first the cognitions and subsequently the motives of 
local authorities. In 2003, a group of farmers from the Qalqiliya and 
Tulkarem area sent applications to the village council asking for urgent 
intervention to help them rehabilitate some of their irrigation wells to use 
them again for irrigation purposes. Initially, the rehabilitation of irrigation 
wells did not have a high priority for the village council. This changed, 
however, after the Separation Wall was built close to Qalqiliya and 
Tulkarem.7 The village council then contacted the PHG to assist them in 
the rehabilitation of these wells which eventually resulted in the ‘Urgent 
Action to secure access of the population in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories’ project funded by ECHO.
The wider conflict context first changed local authorities’ perceptions, 
or cognitions, of the problem at hand: from an agricultural predicament to 
a political emergency. While the rehabilitation of irrigation wells initially 
did not have a high priority for the village council, this changed after the 
Separation Wall was built in Qalqiliya and Tulkarem in 2002. Based on 
Israeli law; farmers risk losing their land if they do not cultivate it, including 
Palestinian farmers with land east of the Green Line. As a result, the motives 
of key decision-makers shifted accordingly. Interests that were initially of a 
practical nature (access to water, improvement of farmers’ livelihoods) 
were now coinciding with strategic interests (continuation of cultivation of 
Palestinian lands between the Green Line and the Wall to maintain 
Palestinian land).8 This conflict-cognizant approach also manifested itself 
in the process of planning and implementation of the MSP in which the 
potential risks related to the conflict were carefully assessed and 
accommodated. These risks included delays in receiving permits, a ‘stop of 
works’ order by the Israeli Defence Forces and military operations. Great 
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effort was taken to minimize risks that water users would be cut off from 
water and to obtain the resources (in this case permits) for the transfer of 
equipment required for rehabilitation of the wells.
Case 2 was affected by the wider conflict context as well. The start of the 
landfill project in October 2000 coincided with the start of the Second 
Intifada, which threatened to crucially undermine the available resources to 
initiate this ambitious project. Not surprisingly, some international staff 
decided to leave the country. Furthermore, the situation created great 
reluctance among international contractors and consultants to engage in 
bidding activities. The hostilities, that started in September 2000 and rapidly 
gained momentum between September and December, had a major impact 
on the project in terms of increased requirements by the Israeli authorities 
for constructors to apply for permits to use and transport certain types of 
equipment. The conflict dynamics caused delays in preparation and 
execution of the core landfill component due to the closing-off of Jenin by 
the Israeli Defence Forces and because ‘project offices were shot at, waste 
containers and access roads were damaged, and it was difficult for project 
staff, consultants and the [World] Bank supervision to operate’ (World 
Bank, 2009, p. 5).9
The impact of the government divide between Hamas and Fatah
In January 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections. This 
resulted in political violence between Fatah and Hamas that culminated in 
numerous deaths. In March 2006 Hamas began setting up its government 
in Gaza, which was followed by international sanctions. Public service 
delivery was severely weakened as a result of the internal fighting, 
international sanctions and the lack of administrative experience among 
Hamas cadre. Although Fatah and Hamas formed a unity government in 
March 2007, Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007, taking over 
government offices and replacing Fatah officials. This was followed by a 
blockade of goods and people by Israel and the suspension of aid by most 
donors (the United States, the European Union, several European countries 
and the Arab states). Since the establishment of a Hamas government in 
Gaza, a transfer of projects took place from the ‘old office’ under the 
Palestinian Authority administration to the ‘new office’ under Hamas 
administration. The subsequent political tension and lack of communication 
between the old and new state institutions led to an extremely challenging 
context for case 4. Staff members from the Environmental Quality Authority 
and the PHG indicated that following a temporary suspension of their 
salaries after Hamas took government authority, payments to the PWA-staff 
were resumed under the condition that they would not resume their 
responsibilities, nor come to the office or take data and information with 
them. This transition was extremely challenging for NGOs and donors that 
were trying to continue their work.
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The hostile and partly paralysed institutional context following from the 
institutional duality of the respective Fatah and Hamas administrative 
structures has affected, first and foremost, the cognitions of the MSP actors 
in the Bureij MSP that increasingly regarded the service provision project 
through a political (in fact conflictual) lens and the availability of resources. 
Communication and cooperation between both PWA and the Coastal 
Municipal Water Utility and the Al-Bureij municipality worsened from 2007 
onwards. The Al-Bureij municipality council was replaced on 18 July 2007. 
Similarly, the community-based local water committee that was established 
in 2006 was very weak due to the internal conflict in June 2007. Therefore, 
a new local committee was established in 2007 that was selected from all 
blocks of the served area, and thus representing various views. According to 
one of the MSP members, nevertheless, re-establishment did not bring 
about smooth cooperation within the local water committee as ‘the seeds of 
conflict were inside this committee’. Ultimately, this particular form of 
institutional multiplicity (or rather institutional polarization) also affected 
the resources available for the MSP due to withdrawal of international donors 
and underutilization of Fatah capacities.
The impact of the fragmentation in areas A, B and C
The West Bank is cantonized into various areas under different governance 
modalities. These areas followed from the Oslo Agreements and the areas 
were further demarcated by the Wye and Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandums. 
Area A (17 per cent of the land of the West Bank) is under Palestinian 
control; in Area B (24 per cent) civil affairs are under Palestinian control 
and security issues are under joint Palestinian–Israeli control; and Area C 
(64 per cent) is under Israeli civil and military control. Palestinians’ access 
to water resources is limited by restrictions inherited from the Oslo 
Agreements. For example, they are not permitted to drill new wells in any 
of these areas or to extend existing wells without an Israeli permit, which is 
considered quite difficult to obtain (IDRC, 2008).
Cases 1 and 2 were particularly affected by the limited Palestinian 
jurisdiction and control over resources stemming from this administrative 
division. For both the Qalqiliya and Tulkarem irrigation well rehabilitation 
project and the Zahrat Al Finjan landfill in Jenin, several permits were 
required from the Joint Water Committee and the Israeli Civilian 
Administration. These permits were necessary for the choice of the location 
(case 2), for the design (case 2), for importing equipment (both) and for 
building new infrastructure (case 2). Yet, due to Jenin’s vicinity to Israeli 
settlements, the Israeli authorities also recognized the importance of 
adequate waste management and the prevention of pollution of groundwater 
that the settlements also depend upon. As a result, the Israeli Environmental 
authorities were reported by MSP members to be quite helpful10 and tried 
to advise the Palestinians on this project.
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The Joint Water Committee has reportedly asked the Palestinian 
authorities, on several other occasions (not related to the four cases), to 
cooperate with the authorities administering the Israeli settlements on the 
West Bank for the establishment of new, or the rehabilitation of existing 
water and wastewater infrastructure – as a condition for permits. The 
Palestinian authorities tend to refuse such demands for obvious reasons: 
formal cooperation with the settlement authorities is perceived as 
legitimizing and recognizing settlements that are illegal according to 
international law.
The overall impact of fragility on Palestinian MSPs in the WASH+ sectors
Fragility in Palestine, as manifested in eruptions of violent conflict and 
institutional multiplicity, has had a range of negative effects on the 
governance and output of the MSPs studied. These effects were 
experienced both directly (in terms of damage to the infrastructure, the 
economy and mobility opportunities)11 and indirectly (in terms of 
institutional arrangements which were the result of the Oslo Agreements 
and beyond). This was most apparent in case 4 in Gaza, which was never 
successfully implemented according to our respondents because of the 
political context described. Across the cases discussed, the negative effect 
was most apparent in the loss of resources through withdrawal of donors, 
underutilization of existing capacities, obstruction and delay in 
implementation processes and destruction of infrastructures and material. 
The wider fragile context also resulted in overly politicized (and often 
polarized) cognitions and motives regarding service provision in general 
and MSP cooperation in particular.
Concurrently, our interviews clearly showed that it was exactly because of 
the challenges and obstacles presented by conflict and institutional 
multiplicity that the inclusion of multiple stakeholders in WASH+ projects 
became a necessity and a partnership approach towards initiating and 
implementing such projects was regarded self-evidently desirable and was 
apparent in the majority of strategic motives of MSP actors. Our research 
also revealed that political unrest is not necessarily prohibiting or halting 
processes of cooperation between multiple stakeholders to improve service 
delivery. Case 2 for instance, the Zahrat Al Finjan project, was submitted 
only two weeks before the onset of the Second Intifada, and has – despite 
some delay – been completed and has reached far more beneficiaries (over 
600,000) than originally intended (200,000). Moreover, case 1 in Qalqiliya 
and Tulkarem gained momentum (and eventual success) precisely because 
of the strategic relevance it acquired. The wider conflict, institutional 
multiplicity and lack of coherence characterizing the Palestinian WASH+ 
section, does not then have one singular effect, but plays out differently in 
different case-specific contexts. While fragmentation leads to more 
polarized motives, more uncertain cognitions and more zero-sum resource 
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allocation in general terms (cf. Chapter 3), it can bring actors together and 
strengthen their ability to resolve as well.
The governance and implementation of the MSPs studied showed a 
remarkable flexibility, an ability ‘not only to see the reality as a field of 
obstacles, but also as a terrain of potential – often unexpected – opportunities 
and being adaptive enough to use every “window of opportunity” to bring 
the ultimate purpose closer to realization’ (Chapter 3 of this book). 
Processes of cooperation and social interaction between multiple 
stakeholders clearly changed during periods of armed conflict and, spurred 
by events such as the Second Intifada, actors applied a range of contingency 
and emergency planning measures with different degrees of success. The 
role of donors and their ground staff changed due to the tense relations 
between Israelis and Palestinians. A strong involvement of donors (in 
particular the European Union and the World Bank) during violent 
episodes in maintaining cordial dialogue with military authorities and 
pressure on the Joint Water Committee, was essential for the continuation 
of the activities and achievement of objectives of some MSPs.
9.6 Conclusion: the applicability of the MSP concept in  
fragile contexts
Synthesizing our above arguments, we arrive at three interrelated 
conclusions considering the applicability of MSPs as a tool for the 
governance of WASH+ projects in fragile settings.
First, partnerships including multiple stakeholders from the public and 
private sectors and civil society emerge in Palestine without explicit top-
down policy guidance. This leads us to agree with Warner (cited in Nuijten, 
2004, p. 117) that MSPs are perhaps more an empirical practice to be 
analysed than a policy prescription to be spread. The degree to which 
partnerships are consciously branded or instigated as MSPs do not seem to 
significantly affect the initiation, governance and implementation of MSPs 
(even if the MSP that was explicitly set up as an MSP did have the most 
extensive and sustainable output).
Second, MSPs do not emerge despite state fragility (in the wider context), 
but in many case exactly because of the multiplicity in actors, structures, 
regulations and practices (the structural context) that can be found in 
fragile situations. Respondents widely recognized the need to deal with 
flare-ups of violent conflict, competing Fatah and Hamas governments in 
Gaza and the administrative fragmentation of the West Bank respondents. 
This on-the-ground reality implies a need for:
1 national authorization of local projects;
2 Israeli permits and approval;
3 donor funding and assistance;
4 community contributions;
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5 NGO lobbying and management;
6 the subsequent need for communication, exchange of information; 
and
7 joint management and decision making.
Third, although fragility might instigate the emergence of MSPs (for 
instance through adding a strategic aspect to practical motives), it 
simultaneously hampers their effectiveness and complicates governance 
and cooperation processes. This occurs as cognitions become polarized and 
politicized and resources diminish, remain unutilized or need to be used 
for conciliation rather than implementation. Thus, MSPs alone do not 
always guarantee a smooth process or a sustainable outcome. Problematic 
community relationships and conflicts can stall the process, in particular 
when stakeholders or beneficiaries have not been sufficiently involved in 
the process from the start.
The above conclusions have several implications for both the study and 
the support of MSPs in fragile contexts. Future focus need not so much be 
on promoting MSPs, as they emerge quite organically in one form or 
another. Donor organizations in the WASH+ sector, in Palestine at least, 
might benefit more from research into the potential for continuity during 
conflict and the dealing with hostile and contradicting authorities than 
from guidelines on initiation and internal stakeholder management. 
Moreover, instead of focusing on generalizing case-specific contexts towards 
a one-size-fits-all model, value might lie in exploring the diverse lessons 
learned on the effect of wider contexts on case-specific contexts and the 
different responses of stakeholders to such wider political developments.
We could not agree more with Bressers and de Boer, who state in 
Chapter 3 that ‘understanding the various impacts from various 
perspectives and influencing factors – particularly in the complex policy 
realm of water governance – is highly dependent on context’, and we 
hope to have convincingly argued that in ‘knowing “what works, where, 
when and how in transferring lessons in water management” ’ more 
attention needs to devoted to the fragile political contexts in which many 
WASH+ projects are set.
Notes
1 See O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleeman (2002) on participatory planning and 
deliberative democracy; Ostrom (1990) and Mayntz (1993) on self-regulating 
institutions and Uphoff (1996) on participatory management (Nuijten, 2004, 
p. 116).
2 Findings and conclusions are discussed in detail in a report (Van der Molen et 
al., 2011) available on the PSDN website: www.psdnetwork.nl.
3 The Green Line was agreed upon as part of the Armistice Agreements of 1949, 
between Israel and the countries around Israel (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Syria).
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4 The project reached 30,044 beneficiaries, 243,000 m2 of land was reclaimed in 
area C and the Seam Zone; 19,505 additional m3 water available for domestic 
use/month; 37 per cent reduction in operational costs; 99.6 per cent reduction 
of water supply interruptions, increase of average abstraction capacity from 
57.5 m3/hour to 104.8 m3/hour; pumping capacity increased by 82 per cent 
and 93 per cent (Van der Molen et al., 2011, p. 41).
5 It goes beyond the purpose of this study to include a more elaborate discussion 
of the academic debate on fragility. A comprehensive overview can be found in 
Van Overbeek et al. (2009).
6 See: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/
Annex12,Aug31,2009(enriched).pdf; http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WaterRestrictionsReport18Apr2009.pdf; 
and http://go.worldbank.org/71X59QSH80, accessed 1 December 2011.
7 The high price of water contributed to the abandonment of land by 123 
farmers, resulting in 570,000 m2 (570 dunums) uncultivated, of which 480 
dunums in area C, and ninety dunums in the seam zone (ECHO, 2010, p. 8).
8 The project, managed by the MSP, was effective in achieving both objectives, by 
providing an additional 19,505 m3/month for domestic water supply, by 37 per 
cent reduction of operational costs, by 99.6 per cent reduction of water supply 
interruptions, and by reclaiming 243 dunums of land in area C and in the seam 
zone. It was less successful in guaranteeing sustainability.
9 The damage to the solid waste infrastructure in Jenin and Tubas governorates 
resulting from actions by the Israeli Defence Forces in the West Bank between 
March and May 2002 was estimated at US$169,820. Operation Cast Lead of 
December 2008/January 2009 resulted in damage of water and wastewater 
infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, with an estimated cost of US$6 million (CMWU, 
2009).
10 Cooperation may also have been facilitated by the Joint Services Council 
decision to hire an Israeli solid waste management expert for redesign of the 
landfill and supervision of the construction.
11 Akkaya et al. (2011) elaborately discuss the detrimental effects of the closures 
regime (consisting of continuous, but unannounced physical and administrative 
road blocks, checkpoints, barriers) on the Palestinian economy. Following 
Diwan and Shaban (1999) and Fischer et al.(2001) and in line with UNESCO 
data, Akkaya et al. estimate that each day of closure costs the Palestinian 
economy US$7 million in terms of lost income.
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